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ABSTRACT
Effective and robust operations, as well as security and pri-
vacy are critical for the deployment of vehicular ad hoc
networks (VANETs). Efficient and easy-to-manage secu-
rity and privacy-enhancing mechanisms are essential for the
wide-spread adoption of the VANET technology. In this
paper, we are concerned with this problem; and in partic-
ular, how to achieve efficient and robust pseudonym-based
authentication. We design mechanisms that reduce the se-
curity overhead for safety beaconing, and retain robustness
for transportation safety, even in adverse network settings.
Moreover, we show how to enhance the availability and us-
ability of privacy-enhancing VANET mechanisms: Our pro-
posal enables vehicle on-board units to generate their own
pseudonyms, without affecting the system security.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [General]: Security and protection; C.2.1 [Network
Architecture and Design]: Wireless communication
General Terms
Performance, Reliability, Security
Keywords
Vehicular networks, Security, Performance, Reliability
1. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) aim at enhancing
safety and efficiency in transportation systems. They com-
prise network nodes, that is, vehicles and road-side infras-
tructure units (RSUs), equipped with on-board sensory, pro-
cessing, and wireless communication modules. Vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) commu-
nication can enable a range of applications. Among these,
primarily safety will be enabled, as numerous research and
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development initiatives indicate, by vehicles frequently bea-
coning their position, along with warnings on their condition
or environment. Nonetheless, VANETs can be vulnerable to
attacks and jeopardize users’ privacy. For example, an at-
tacker could inject beacons with false information, or collect
vehicles’ messages, track their locations, and infer sensitive
user data. To thwart such attacks, security and privacy-
enhancing mechanisms are necessary or, in fact, a prerequi-
site for deployment.
This has been recently well understood; currently, at least
three concerted efforts, the IEEE 1609.2 working group [20],
the NoW project [18], and the SeVeCom project [26], are
developing VANET security architectures. Their common
basic elements include the use of Certification Authorities
(CAs) and public key cryptography to protect V2V and
V2I messages. Message authentication, integrity, and non-
repudiation, as well as protection of private user information
are identified as primary requirements.
Solutions for these seemingly contradictory goals are influ-
enced by proposals targeting the wire-line Internet. Pseudo-
nymity or pseudonymous authentication requires that each
node is equipped with multiple credentials, e.g., certified
public keys that do not reveal the node identity, e.g., as
those in the early [15], termed pseudonyms. This way, mes-
sages signed under different pseudonyms cannot be linked
[29, 17, 30, 6]. Meanwhile, [12] mentions VANET as an
application for group signatures [16, 7, 31, 13], that is, cryp-
tographic primitives for anonymous authentication. This is
a stronger property than pseudonymous authentication, as
any two group signatures generated by a node cannot be
linked. Pseudonymous authentication has already gained
wide acceptance in the VANET community [20, 18, 26],
while anonymous authentication incurs additional overhead,
as it will become clear in the rest of the paper. This is why
our investigation focuses on pseudonym-based systems.
Many technical issues and interesting questions remain
to be answered in order to deploy pseudonym-based secure
vehicular communications. Given that the security over-
head will be significant, is it possible to reduce it without
weakening security? Do vehicular communications, and in
particular safety applications, remain robust? What is the
effect of the security and the pseudonym-based mechanisms
on safety applications? Can the cost of providing vehicles
with large numbers of pseudonyms be waived and still meet
security and privacy requirements?
In this paper, we provide answers to these questions. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first investigation on
these aspects of the pseudonym-based approach. In Sec. 2,
we define more precisely the problem at hand and outline
our approach to addressing it. The scheme components are
presented in Sec. 4. We evaluate the proposed mechanisms
and compare to alternatives, analyzing overhead, efficiency
and robustness in Sections 5 and 6.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
V2V and V2I Communication over the wireless medium
employs theDedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)
data link technology [2]. Vehicles transmit periodic status
updates (beacons) on a common channel dedicated to emer-
gency situations, among the available seven DSRC channels.
In this work, we are interested in the type of messaging that
enables safety applications. Beaconing rates ρ range from
3 beacons to 10 beacons/sec, with the latter currently envi-
sioned as mandatory for safety applications. We assume ρ
= 10 in the paper. We do not dwell on the beacon content;
information, for example, on the vehicle condition, position,
speed, or various warnings, as well as accurate time can
be obtained by on-board sensors and other hardware (e.g.
GPS) [20].
We focus on vehicle-initiated transmissions, as there is no
need to safeguard the privacy of infrastructure nodes. We
assume that each node (vehicle) has a long-term, unique
identity, that combines a number of attributes [27]. Nodes
also have cryptographic keys associated with their long-term
identities, managed by an authority we refer to, for simplic-
ity, as Certification Authority (CA). All legitimate nodes are
registered with the CA, which can evict a node if necessary,
i.e., revoke its credentials. The CA is also vested with the
legal power to disclose node identities when necessary, if pre-
sented with one or more messages, for liability attribution.
This is especially needed when privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies are used.
3. PROBLEM AND APPROACH OVERVIEW
We are interested in a secure vehicular communications
system that provides message authentication, integrity, and
non-repudiation. At the same time, cryptographically pro-
tected messages should not allow for their sender to be iden-
tified, and two or more messages generated by the same node
should be difficult to link to each other. More precisely, mes-
sages produced by a node over a protocol-selectable period
of time τ can be linked, but messages m1,m2 generated at
times t1, t2 respectively, such that t2 > t1 + τ , cannot. The
shorter τ is, the fewer the linkable messages are, and the
harder tracking a node becomes.
Intuitively, it suffices that a node switches to a new sign-
ing key, and the corresponding public key, every τ seconds.
Then, only messages signed (verified) with the same secret
(public) key can be linked to each other. This is essentially
the idea behind pseudonym schemes, explained further in
Sec. 4.1, with τ corresponding to the period one pseudonym
is used. We emphasize that our goal here is not a formaliza-
tion of such notions, nor to prove the protection pseudonym
schemes provide against various types of adversaries.
Our objective is to design a usable system based on pseudo-
nyms, which satisfies the above-stated security requirements
and allows liability attribution. Equally important, we aim
at amodular design that in the future will allow system users
to upgrade mechanisms (e.g., cryptographic primitives) or
adjust system parameters (e.g., security levels), so that more
stringent requirements can be met.
First, we propose that each vehicle generate its own pseudo-
nyms, in order to eliminate the need of pre-loading, stor-
ing and refilling pseudonyms and the corresponding private
keys. This way, the burden of key and pseudonym (and es-
sentially identity) management is greatly reduced; and so is
the cost of obtaining the pseudonyms over an“off-line”chan-
nel (e.g., localized, wired or wireless, connection to special-
ized infrastructure, or 3G cellular link downloads). More-
over, the usability and efficiency of the system is enhanced:
(i) vehicles do not need to be side-lined or to compromise
their user’s privacy if previously unused pseudonyms are no
longer available, (ii) no “over-provisioning” in the supply of
pseudonyms is necessary.
However, self-generation of pseudonyms comes, at first
glance, at a higher transmission and processing cost. We
propose a number of optimizations to reduce overhead, which
is significant as pseudonym-based approaches mandate that
in general pseudonyms are attached to the transmitted mes-
sages [29, 30, 6]. Without compromising security (i.e., all
messages are cryptographically validated), we integrate in
our system methods for pseudonym dissemination, valida-
tion, and generation, which significantly reduce overhead.
Moreover, we identify a new limitation due to pseudonym
changes: their impact on safety applications. We propose
a scheme to mitigate it and, more generally, investigate ro-
bustness in adverse wireless networking settings, considering
emergency braking as a case study.
4. SCHEME OUTLINE
In this section, we describe our proposed scheme that re-
lies on the concept of pseudonymous authentication, which
we term Baseline Pseudonym (BP) (Sec. 4.1). Our scheme
allows the on-the-fly generation of own pseudonyms using
Group Signatures (GS) (Sec. 4.2), in combination with the
BP approach; this is what we term as Hybrid scheme (Sec. 4.3).
Optimizations for efficiency and robustness are presented in
Sec. 4.4.
4.1 Baseline Pseudonyms
Each node (vehicle) V is equipped with a set of pseudonyms,
that is, public keys certified by the CA without any informa-
tion identifying V . For the i-th pseudonym KiV for node V ,
the CA provides a certificate CertCA(K
i
V ), which is simply
a CA signature on the public key KiV . The private key k
i
V
corresponding to the pseudonym KiV is used by the node to
digitally sign messages. To enable message validation, the
pseudonym and certificate of the signer are attached in each
message. With σki
V
() denoting V ’s signature under its i-th
pseudonym and m the signed message payload, the message
format is:
m,σki
V
(m),KiV , CertCA(K
i
V ) (1)
The CA maintains a map from the long-term identity of
V to the {KiV } set of pseudonyms provided to a node. If
presented with a Msg.(1), the CA can perform the inverse
mapping and identify the signer.
Each pseudonym is used at most for a period τ and then
discarded. We abstract away a number of implementation
details one could consider, such as the dynamic adaptation of
the period of pseudonym usage, other policies for pseudonym
change, factors rendering a pseudonym change unnecessary
(e.g., a TCP connection to an access point), and interactions
of pseudonym changes with the network stack [26]. They are
important yet largely orthogonal to this investigation. Nev-
ertheless, the extent of a pre-load or the frequency of refills
with a set of KiV and the corresponding k
i
V , CertCA(K
i
V ),
can affect the usability of the system.
Upon receipt of Msg.1, a node, with the public key of the
CA assumed available, validates CertCA(K
i
V ). It makes use
of a Certificate Revocation List (CRL), also assumed to be
distributed to vehicles via the infrastructure [30]. If success-
ful, i.e., KiV is not included in the CRL and CA signature
on KiV is valid, the node validates σki
V
(m).
4.2 Group Signatures
Each node V is equipped with a secret group signing key
gskV , with the group comprising as members all vehicles
registered with the CA. A group public key gpkCA allows for
the validation (by any node) of any group signature ΣCA,V
generated by a group member. Intuitively, a group signature
scheme allows any node V to sign a message on behalf of the
group without V ’s identity being revealed to the signature
verifier. Moreover, it is impossible to link any two signa-
tures of a legitimate group member. Note that no public
key or other credentials need to be attached to a message
anonymously authenticated; the format is:
m,ΣCA,V (m) (2)
The concept of group signatures, introduced by Chaum
[16], is revisited in numerous works, e.g., [7, 31, 13, 11],
with formal definitions in [8, 9]. For the rest of the dis-
cussion, we assume and utilize the group signature scheme
proposed in [12]. If the identification of a signer is necessary,
the CA can perform an Open operation [8, 9] and reveal the
signer’s identity. A Revocation List (RL) can also be con-
structed, so that a signature by a revoked group member
can be identified by any verifier. Again, we assume the re-
vocation method proposed in [12].
4.3 Hybrid Scheme
The combination of the pseudonym scheme with the GS
scheme is the basic element of our proposed scheme. Each
node V is equipped with a group signing key gskV and the
group public key gpkCA. Rather than generating group sig-
natures to protect messages, a node generates an own set
of pseudonyms {KiV } (and corresponding private kiV keys),
and uses gskV to generate a group signature ΣCA,V () on
each pseudonym KiV .
Essentially, the nodes generate and “self-certify” KiV on-
the-fly, producing CertHCA(K
i
V ). The H superscript denotes
the hybrid scheme and differentiates this certificate from
that of the BP approach. The CA subscript denotes that
the certificate was generated by a legitimate node registered
with CA. Similarly to Msg.(1), V attaches the CertHCA(K
i
V )
to each message, and signs with the corresponding kiV :
m,σki
V
(m),KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ) (3)
Upon receipt of a Msg.(3), the group signature ΣCA,V (K
i
V )
is validated, using the gpkCA and the RL. If successful,
the receiver infers that a legitimate system (group) member
generated pseudonym KiV . We emphasize that, as per the
properties of group signatures, the receiver/verifier of the
certificate cannot identify V and cannot link this certificate
and pseudonym to any prior pseudonym used by V . Once
the legitimacy of the pseudonym is established, the valida-
tion of σki
V
(m) is identical to that for Msg.(1). To identify
the signer of message, an Open on the CertHCA(K
i
V ) group
signature is necessary; the message m is bound to KiV via
σki
V
(m), and KiV is bound to V via ΣCA,V (K
i
V ).
4.4 Optimizations
We identify optimizations to reduce overhead (Optimiza-
tions 1 and 2) and enhance robustness (Optimization 3). All
three are applicable for both BP and the Hybrid scheme.
Optimization 1. At the sender side, the CertHCA(KiV ) is
computed only once per KiV , because Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ) remains
unchanged throughout the pseudonym lifetime τ . For the
same reason, at the verifier’s side the CertHCA(K
i
V ) is vali-
dated upon the first reception and stored, even though the
sender appends it to multiple (all) messages. For all subse-
quent receptions, if the CertHCA(K
i
V ) has already been seen,
the verifier skips its validation. This optimization is useful
because τ >> ρ−1.
Optimization 2. The sender appends
σki
V
(m),KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ) once every αmessages (beacons);
it appends only σki
V
(m) on the remaining α−1 ones. We call
α the Certificate period. Msg.(1) and (3) remain unchanged,
and all messages will carry a 4-byte keyID field, that is, a
random number indicating which KiV must be used to val-
idate the σki
V
(m). The keyID does not affect privacy as
there is a 1:1 correspondence with KiV . When a pseudonym
change occurs, the new triplet
σ
ki+1
V
(m),Ki+1V , Cert
H
CA(K
i+1
V ) must be computed and trans-
mitted. V will sign messages with the new ki+1V correspond-
ing to Ki+1V from then on.
Optimization 2 can harm protocol robustness, if the mes-
sage carrying Ki+1V , Cert
H
CA(K
i+1
V ) is not received. Then,
nodes in range of V must wait for α messages for the next
pseudonym/certifcate transmission, while being unable to
validate any message from V . The danger arises especially
if the vehicles are close to each other and/or move at high
relative speeds. Thus, we propose the following scheme to
mitigate this problem:
Optimization 3. The transmission ofKi+1V , CertHCA(Ki+1V )
is repeated for p consecutive messages when the Ki+1V is is-
sued. We denote p at the Push period.
5. CRYPTOGRAPHIC OVERHEAD
We choose to employ ECDSA as the basic signature al-
gorithm [4], the group signature (GS) proposed by Boneh
and Shacham [12], and security level of t=80 bits for mes-
sage signatures and t=128 bits for CA certificates in BP and
for GS. The rationale is that high security is not necessary
for the short-lived KiV , although it is for the long-term GS
keys. Table 1 shows the costs for signature, verification and
overhead for the chosen algorithms.
As implementations of group signatures and the chosen
GS were not available to us, we calculated the number of
32-bit word multiplications required for GS signing and ver-
ifying, extracting the relevant data from [14] and [22]. To ob-
tain a processing delay estimate, we ran benchmarks for the
Algorithm Security level Sign Verify Signature Public key Private key
(bits) (s) (s) (bytes) (bytes) (bytes)
ECDSA-192 80 5e-4 3e-3 48 25 24
ECDSA-256 128 8e-4 4.2e-3 64 33 32
GS 80 1.78e-2 1.56e-2 151 278 43
GS 128 5.37e-2 4.93e-2 225 800 64
Table 1: Computation costs and communication overhead for different signing algorithms.
multiplications. For ECDSA we also measured the OpenSSL
[3] delays. All measurements were made on a Centrino ma-
chine with the clock speed set at 1.5 GHz; this is a close
approximation for the CVIS vehicle PC, a platform adopted
for the future development of VANET applications [1].
5.1 Computation
For cryptographic primitives, the individual delays are
shown for each operation in Table 1. For individual mes-
sage cryptographic processing delays, it suffices to add the
corresponding cryptographic primitives delays as explained
below. We recall that the security levels are t = 80 for
σki
V
(m) and t = 128 for CertCA(K
i
V ) and ΣCA,V (m).
For BP, a sender computes a σki
V
(m) for each message,
and each receiver will validate one σki
V
(m) per message and
one CertCA(K
i
V ) for each pseudonym. Thus, the costs per
message will be: 5e-4 s/msg for signing, and 7.2e-3 ms/msg
for verification.
For GS, each vehicle will need to generate and verify one
ΣCA,V (m) per message, either transmitted or received. This
costs around 5.37e-2 s/msg for signing and 4.93e-2 s/msg for
verification.
For Hybrid, the cost is one σki
V
(m) generation and veri-
fication per message and one CertHCA(K
i
V ) generation and
verification per pseudonym. The costs are 5.42e-2 s/msg for
signing, and 5.23e-2 s/msg for verification.
The costs so far are do not include any optimization. If we
consider Optimization 1, we normalize the processing delays
over one pseudonym lifetime τ ; the cost of certification is
amortized over τ and the cost per message becomes the one
shown in Table 2. We elect, here without loss of generality,
an indicative value τ = 60 sec, and we recall the message
rate of ρ = 10 messages per second. When Optimization 2
is in place, the costs of the shorter messages simply sum up
to one ECDSA signature.
5.2 Overhead
The KiV and the CertCA(K
i
V ) are 89 bytes for BP, and
with σki
V
(m) the overhead is 137 bytes per message. For
GS, the overhead is ΣCA,V (m), thus 225 bytes per message.
For Hybrid, the overhead is σki
V
(m),KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ), in
total 298 bytes per message.
These figures do not consider Optimization 2: its effect
on the overhead will be presented in Sec. 6.
For the α−1 messages transmitted without attaching the
pseudonym and the certificate, the overhead is σki
V
(m) plus
a randomly generated by the signer keyID, to indicate which
pseudonym this message is generated under and facilitates
verification; the overhead is 52 bytes.
Scheme Sign Verify Overhead
(s) (s) (bytes)
BP 5e-4 3e-3 137
GS 5.37e-2 4.93e-2 225
Hybrid 6e-4 3.1e-3 298
Table 2: Processing costs, in seconds, for different
signing schemes, over τ = 60 sec, for Optimization 1,
and packet overhead, in bytes, without optimization.
5.3 Storage and Generation costs
For BP, all the needed KiV have to be loaded to the OBU
at the refilling session. We must over-provision the vehicles
in order to account even for the heaviest car usage until the
next refilling session e.g. 8-10 hours of car use per day, every
day. This approximates to i = 200.000 assuming a refilling
period of one year. Each kiV ,K
i
V pair is 113 bytes, given by
one ECDSA-192 key pair and one CA certificate (e.g. one
ECDSA-256 signature). These figures account for a storage
of 22 MBytes.
For GS, each node V needs only to store its gskV and the
gpkCA. Similarly, for the Hybrid Scheme, pseudonyms will
be generated when needed on the fly. A generation is more
or less equivalent to a signature for ECDSA.
Finally, the approaches based on GS require a periodic re-
freshing and storage of gskV and gpkCA (but not constrained
by the possibility of running out of keys).
5.4 Revocation
To compare the costs of these different approaches, we
normalize the cost for checking a given pseudonym or group
signature against one entry of the (certificate) revocation
list. We note that for BP, the size of CRL is much higher
than the size of RL for GS and Hybrid as it includes revoked
pseudonyms, not nodes. We assume the numbers for the
system configuration as in Sec. 5.3.
For BP, each KiV must be checked against a CRL through
a number of string comparisons linear to the CRL size. For
GS, the revocation check, performed for each ΣCA,V (m),
involves two pairing calculations followed by a string com-
parison. The RL is linear in the number of revoked group
members. For Hybrid, revocation requires two pairing cal-
culations, per KiV (similar to BP); the RL is again linear in
the number of revoked group members.
We assume that a string comparison takes 1e-6 sec and a
pairing calculation 5e-3 sec (as per the benchmarks above).
If RLCheck is the cost of comparing one entry in the RL
for GS, the cost for the same operation for BP is 1e-4*
RLCheck.
Scheme Sign Verify Sign Verify Overhead
KiV K
i
V m m (bytes)
Hybrid 38752 33994 793 3394 224
Zeng [37] 10536 20056 4758 2379 171
Table 3: Costs associated to different signing
schemes, in number of multiplications, for t = 80
bits, without Optimization 2.
Then, V’s revocation for BP implies including in the CRL
all the not yet used pseudonyms, thus the cost is in the order
of 1e5 per node. This cost depends on the data structure
and search algorithm used to handle the revocation data in
memory. If we assume the use of a hash map, the cost is
essentially an O(1) search time (in this case, a prior hash
map construction is needed with a cost of O(n)). The cost
would then be 1e-4 * RLCheck.
For GS, this will takeτ ∗ ρ ∗RLCheck = 600 ∗RLCheck,
while for Hybrid it will be simply RLCheck. This implies
that BP is the least costly solution in this aspect, not con-
sidering memory requirements to handle a (possibly) large
RL.
Revoked vehicles could mount a DoS attack by forcing
other parties to verify not valid signatures. We observe that
this is not worse than jamming the whole spectrum. While
this attack is surely possible it does not open new vulnera-
bilities.
5.5 An alternate approach
It is worthwhile to compare our approach with the one
proposed in [37] and [6]. These data are summarized in
Table 3. Zeng’s approach is faster and bears less over-
head, however we do not choose it in our system because it
does not satisfy the modularity requirement. Also, choosing
t = 128 bits implies choosing the same high security level
message signing.
5.6 Pseudonym lifetime
As τ gets smaller, a vehicle becomes less traceable, yet
at a performance premium, in particular due to signature
verifications. We vary τ from 60 down to 3 seconds, and re-
calculate the signing and verification costs for Hybrid: they
range from the above given values up to 4.6e-3 and 2.3e-3
s/msg respectively. These costs are still low, yet in a dense
neighborhood the cost per node can be high. In fact, time
spent on signatures validation would then be significant with
respect to τ . For example, for 100 vehicles within range,
each beaconing at 10 beacons per second, the total verifica-
tion time for a given V would be 2.3e-1 sec, i.e., 7.7% of the
total time. This is more clearly a problem, as we consider
here only the safety messaging and not other application
traffic. Finally, recall that τ also impacts the size of (C)RLs
and revocation performance.
6. OPTIMIZATION EVALUATION
6.1 Simulation Setup
We design a simulator in C and consider the study in
[33], which shows that given a realistic radio propagation
model [25] and a situation of heavy traffic the reception
probability is at best 60%. This corresponds to a setup of
nodes transmitting 500-byte long (including security over-
Figure 1: Simulation setup.
head) beacons at ρ = 10 msg/sec, with a nominal transmis-
sion range R = 200 meters [35, 29, 33, 2]. We model the
channel as a linearization of the packet reception probability
function in [33]:
P (d) = −0.004d+ 0.6 (4)
where d is the distance between the receiver and the trans-
mitter, and P the reception probability.
In the simulations, a node V is chosen as transmitter and
a node U as receiver (U1 in Fig. 1), positioned at an initial
distance of d meters (U always behind V ). U moves with
a constant relative speed v with respect to V . The simu-
lation ends when U is ahead out of range (P () = 0) of V .
Results for each simulation scenario are averaged over 5000
randomly seeded iterations.
To understand the system dependency from the chan-
nel quality, we consider two additional probability reception
functions:
P (d) = −0.006d+ 1 (5)
and
P (d) = −0.004d+ 1
7
∗ sin( pi
125
d) + 1 (6)
Eq.5 is a linearization of the one in [32], corresponding
to a static scenario with ρ = 4 msg/sec and R = 200m.
Eq.6 is artificially generated to represent favorable channel
conditions, following the trends in [33, 32], taking P (0) = 1
and P < 0.1 for d=200m. All three equations are plotted in
Fig. 2.
The first metric we are interested in is the (mean) distance
at which U receives KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ), after V switched to
the i-th pseudonym KiV . This is important: the higher the
distance from V at which σki
V
(m) can be validated, the more
time the driver of U has at its disposal to react to any detri-
mental situation. The second metric of interest is the secu-
rity overhead with as a function of α.
6.2 Overhead
We calculate overhead as the load offered due to security,
summing the overhead for all messages transmitted per node
over one certificate period α, divided by α. Thus, the over-
head of Msg.1 and 3 is amortized over the entire period α.
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Fig. 3 shows the resultant overhead when Optimization 2 is
applied. Clearly, without the optimization the overhead is
high, but then decreases rapidly as α increases.
The minimum overhead is achieved for the maximum α =
15 used here, resulting in 58, 69, and 81 bytes for the BP,
Hybrid, and Zeng approaches respectively. We observe that
Zeng’s approach, by using high security even for the short-
lived pseudonyms, performs worse than Hybrid, thus incur-
ring 17% higher overhead at α = 15 messages.
We also observe that for all approaches the overhead can
be reduced down to a point of negligible marginal utility. If
we consider this to be the point at which any subsequent
increase in α will reduce overhead only by one extra byte,
this point will be for BP at α = 9 (with overhead of 62
bytes), for Hybrid at α = 13 (overhead 72 bytes) and for
Zeng at α = 12 (overhead 85 bytes).
6.3 Basic Results
Next, we evaluate how α affects the distance at which U
receives the first KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ), with v = 20 Km/h and
d = 150 meters. We repeat the simulation for all the three
probability reception functions, with results in Fig. 4.
As expected, U receives the first KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ) closer
to V when α is higher; the confidence intervals also widen.
The reason is that if aKiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ) is missed, for high α
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Figure 4: Reception of first certificate for d = 150 m,
v = 20 Km/h.
will have approached V at the next KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ) trans-
mission. This remains true for all simulated scenarios. For
channel Eq.(4), at α = 15 the KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ) is received
on the average at 95 meters, and for more favorable channel
conditions improves to 117 or 132 meters. Regarding the
standard deviation of the reception distance: it increases
with α. It ranges from 1.07 to 3.58 to 7.54 for α = 1,
and from 11.41 to 18.89 to 26.73 for α = 15, depending on
the channel model. Clearly, for favorable channels standard
deviation is lower; e.g., for Eq.(6) and α = 15 results are
comparable to the ones for Eq. 4 and α = 1.
6.4 Impact of pseudonym change on safety
A change of KiV could be dangerous for vehicles close to
V . We investigate this next, taking into account (low) ini-
tial distances (at the time of pseudonym change) and (high)
relative speeds between the V and other vehicles.
Impact of initial vehicle distance.
We vary d between V and U (e.g., U2 in Fig. 1), and
experiment with d set to 10, 30 and 50 meters. The results
are shown in Fig. 5. he three curves have similar trends,
with a slight difference at closer distances, due to the fact
that P is higher for lower d; note that curves are not parallel.
Impact of relative speed.
The certificate dissemination also varies depending on the
relative speed between V and U . Thus we fix d = 30 meters
and set v =10, 20 and 50 Km/h. The results are in Fig. 6.
Again, the higher v the worse the results.
By comparing Figures 5 and 6 we observe that increasing
v from 20 to 50 Km/h is equivalent to having d = 10 me-
ters rather than 30 for α = 15 messages. More important,
we see that for both figures we have negative values. This
means that the pseudonym and certificate are received after
U passed ahead of V , or collided with it, if they were in the
same lane. This make clear the issue that careful design of
optimizations is need. Otherwise, efficiency can compromise
robustness.
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Figure 5: Reception of first certificate for reception
function 4, v = 20 Km/h.
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Figure 6: Reception of first certificate for reception
function 4, d = 30 m.
6.5 Enhancing robustness
We show here how Optimization 3 can address this prob-
lem, with small distances or high relative speeds between V
and U when switching to a new Ki+1V We fix α = 10 mes-
sages (this is a value closer to the point of negligible marginal
utility with respect to the overhead). We vary the push pe-
riod p from 0 (no pushing) to 10 messages. The results are
in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8.
Optimization 3 is effective: From the fourth pushed mes-
sage it enables reception within 5 meters after the pseudonym
change, regardless of speed and initial distance. Clearly, the
actual reception distance depends on those parameters. We
also observe that increasing p, thus redundancy, does not
improve robustness further, e.g., for p beyond 4 to 6; this is
a guideline to balance robustness with efficiency.
6.6 Case study: emergency braking
To understand the impact on safety applications, we con-
sider V making an emergency brake. U has to brake as
well in order to avoid the collision, but it can do so after it
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Figure 7: Reception of first certificate for reception
function 4, v = 20 Km/h, α = 10 messages.
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Figure 8: Reception of first certificate for reception
function 4, d = 30 m, α = 10 messages.
receives KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ) and its driver becomes aware of
the alert (some time after receiving it). As this case study
serves as a proof of concept only, we consider here a simple
scenario without other vehicles in between U and V .
We simulate in a custom simulator the scenario with V
moving at 50, 65 and 80 Km/h depending on the channel
model employed, 4, 5, 6 respectively . We chose different
speeds as the channel models are an abstraction of channel
saturation, which depends on the vehicle density, and ve-
hicles move slower when their density is higher. U’s speed
is set 20 Km/h higher than V’s, d to 150 meters, the re-
action time of U is chosen randomly between 0.75 and 1.5
s, both vehicles’ length is 4 m, deceleration is -6 m/s2. α
ranges from 1 to 10, to show the impact of Optimization 2 on
the system, and there are no pseudonym changes during the
simulation. We repeated the simulation 10000 times per sce-
nario and calculated the percentage of crashes. U becomes
warned after it successfully receives KiV , Cert
H
CA(K
i
V ) and
the emergency message.
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Figure 9: Percentage of crashes for the emergency
braking scenario.
Reception function Push no. of crashes
4 yes 57
4 no 61
5 yes 47
5 no 57
6 yes 40
6 no 75
Table 4: Impact of pushing certificates in the emer-
gency braking scenario, d = 75 m.
The results, reported in Fig. 9 show that the certificate
period affects the number of crashes. This ranges from al-
most no crashes for all reception models to a significant value
when Optimization 2 is in use. The crash occurrence per-
centages are not negligible. However, we make the following
observations: (i) we consider only vehicles coming to a full
stop but in many cases a simple slowdown would be suffi-
cient to avoid the danger, (ii) we do not consider the actual
road conditions that correspond to the given, adverse chan-
nel model; when the road is congested, drivers tend to adjust
their speed to their neighbors, thus avoiding or significantly
reducing the exagerated here danger, (iii) the application
model we employ could be improved, for example, by buffer-
ing emergency messages originating from not yet validated
vehicles, in order to speed up the provision of the alert to the
driver once the message is validated. Note that switching to
a lower α could in general add to the channel saturation,
thus not always leading to an improvement [34]. Optimiza-
tion 3 is of little use at the experiments with d = 150 meters,
because at high distances the reception probability is close
to zero and thus certificate retransmissions are not effective.
Optimization 3 becomes effective when d=75 meters: in this
case, the number of crashes is reduced, as shown in Table 4,
where the pushing is fixed to p=10 messages.
7. RELATED WORK
The idea of pseudonym self-generation for ubiquitous com-
puting is proposed, independent of our work in [37], and
more recently [6] mentioned that the cryptosystem in [37]
can be applied to VANET. These works do not consider
all the system-level issues we consider in this work, such
as certificate distribution and application robustness. Our
findings and mechanisms apply to their work, as our results
show, essentially complementing and extending it.
The use of pseudonyms was first envisioned by [15], and
their use is explored by more recent works, e.g., [29, 17, 18,
26]. A number of recent works are concerned with different
aspects of security and privacy of vehicular networks, either
outlining challenges [36], [28], describing particular attacks
[21], [10] or more general attack overviews [5], offering gen-
eral suggestions towards solutions [17], [30], proposing mech-
anisms [19], [29], [24], [20], or trying to offer a general system
overview [27]. The work of [23] combines public and sym-
metric key cryptography to authenticate messages, and it
is complementary to our work. [33] and [32] provide exten-
sive analysis of VANET channel conditions and modeling,
and [34] provides a distributed algorithm to fairly share the
available bandwidth. Due to space limitations, we refrain
from discussing related work in further detail and refer our
readers to references within the cited works.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a new approach to managing cre-
dentials in VANETs. With the BP approach as reference, we
propose on-board, vehicle, on-the-fly pseudonym generation
and self-certification. This alleviates one of the most signifi-
cant limitations of the pseudonym-based approach: the need
for complex management. To achieve this, we propose the
use of group signatures, in order to ensure that legitimate
nodes can anonymously and in a liable manner generate their
pseudonyms.
We analyze the proposed scheme in terms of computa-
tional and overhead costs, and we show that it maintains its
cost closely comparable to that of BP. This is due to the opti-
mizations we propose, applicable to our scheme as well as to
others. We also investigate robustness for safety messaging.
We identify a new critical weakness of the pseudonym-based
approach: the impact of pseudonym changes on the safety
applications; and we show how to address it.
Overall, we contribute a detailed investigation of a range
of system issues, and we show how pseudonym-based au-
thentication can be applied in practice in VANETs, estab-
lishing it as a viable approach.
For future work, we intend to study how to dynamically
adapt the certificate period α to the system conditions. Sim-
ulations capturing actual traffic and vehicle movement mod-
els can validate findings in that direction, as well as further
investigations on robustness. Finally, we will investigate as-
pects of revocation that are beyond the scope of this paper,
such as system deployment, CRL distribution, and existence
of multiple CAs.
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